Abstract
Introduction
Multiple target tracking (MTT) in video is a critical and fundamental task in many real applications, e.g. video surveillance, vision-based interfaces, and video analysis. This task would not have been more difficult than tracking a single target, if multiple targets had quite different visual appearances or were not present in close vicinity. In practice, however, it is very common that those targets may look similar and may occlude each other in video during their interactions. As a result, it is understandable that losing tracks and associating wrong tracks to some targets are common experiences of the failures in vision-based MTT systems.
The challenge roots in the difficulty that estimating the motions of multiple targets cannot be treated independently if they are present in close vicinity, because their visual observations (or visual evidence) are mixed and it is generally very difficult, if not impossible, to figure out the right associations of these observations to the individuals targets (that implies a general segmentation problem). To handle this difficulty, the motions of multiple targets have to be jointly estimated from the mixed visual observations, which makes MTT much more difficult than tracking a single target as the solution space of MTT is much larger.
This joint estimation problem can be performed in a centralized fashion by formulating a joint observation model, as treated in many existing methods [13, 9, 12, 7, 6, 11, 14, 19, 8] . Because the joint observation model evaluates hypotheses of joint motion states, these methods lead to complicated centralized MTT trackers that generally need to search a rather high dimensional solution space. This paper brings a new view to MTT from a gametheoretic perspective, bridging the joint motion estimation and the Nash Equilibrium of a game. It advocates a decentralized methodology that solves MTT through the competition among a set of simple individual target trackers. These individual trackers compete against each other for visual observations, and each individual tracker tries to maximize its visual evidence for explaining its motion and also generates interferences to other individual trackers. This can naturally be formulated as a game in which individual trackers are players, each of which estimates its own motion (i.e., choosing its own strategy) by optimizing its own objective (i.e., utility or payoff). The solution to MTT is tied to the Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) [10] of the game, where no player can achieve a better payoff by choosing a different strategy.
The objective functions for the individual trackers cannot be arbitrarily chosen, for example based on intuitions or heuristics, as they characterize the game and its Nash Equilibrium and thus influencing the solution to MTT. To make this clear, specifically, this paper presents a solid and novel case study where individual trackers are kernel-based trackers [2, 3] . Based on the kernel representation, we introduce 1 an interference model that describes the visual observations of the individual tracker by considering the interferences generated from other trackers, and then define a joint motion estimation problem. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of this joint optimization produce a fixed-point equation. Naive iteration is not likely to reach the fixedpoint, as it may not converge. Therefore, inspired by the supermodular game theory, we construct a game whose Nash Equilibrium corresponds to the fixed-point of the KKT conditions. More important, we design an efficient iterative best-response updating procedure that guarantees the convergence to the N.E. under certain conditions and this is provable. This best-response updating is done in a closed form thus it is quite computationally appealing.
The proposed game-theoretic MTT method has many merits. First, it is decentralized as each individual tracker only needs to optimize its own objective, and the complicated joint motion estimation is avoided. This decentralized scheme greatly reduces the computational complexity. In addition, the individual motion estimation is computed in a simple closed form and is computationally very efficient. Moreover, the proposed method is theoretically plausible because of its convergence properties.
Related work
Multiple target tracking has been studied extensively in literature and can be back-traced to [13] . Most work assume that one target hypothesis can only claim a single image observation and one observation can only support one hypothesis. This assumption can be referred as a probabilistic exclusion principle [9] and used as a prior in the well-known joint probabilistic data association filter (JPDAF) [1, 12] and multiple hypothesis tracking (MHT) [4] . Thus, the key problem in multiple target tracking is to infer the optimal joint motion configuration in a high dimensional space. This can be done in a centralized fashion by sampling or sequential Monte Carlo [9, 14, 7, 6, 19, 11, 8] , or evolutionary optimization [5] , or in a decentralized manner [18] by inferring on a Markov Network. Object detectors may also be included [11, 17] .
Different from these existing methods, we bridge the joint motion estimation and the Nash Equilibrium of a game. We construct a non-cooperative game [10, 15] that characterizes the competition among a set of individual trackers. The Nash Equilibrium of this game corresponds to a local optimum of the joint motion configuration and can be solved by an efficient decentralized method.
Interference model
In this section, we introduce a new analytical interference model for kernel-based trackers, which is a key component in formulating the game-theoretic MTT. This interference model takes both target appearances and spatial relations into consideration.
Joint likelihood maximization
Denote the motion parameters for the ith target by θ i . Its corresponding support is denoted by Ω i , i.e. the set of pixels {x n } within the region of target i. Thus, the motions of a number of N targets can be estimated by maximizing the joint likelihood,
If no occlusion is present, i.e.
This joint optimization can be done independently:
If occlusion is present, i.e.
can assign the pixels in the overlapped regions to different targets probabilistically, thus
whereΩ i is the probabilistic support of target i. This is equivalent to an energy minimization problem:
Kernel-based likelihood
Specifically, for a kernel-based tracker, a target is represented by a kernel weighted feature histogram [2] . The motion parameters are denoted by θ = {y, h}, where y is the location of the kernel center and h is its scale. Denote by x n the 2D pixel location and z n = || xn−y h ||. The kernel function k(z 2 n ) in this paper is the Epanechnikov kernel:
where d = 2 and c d is the area of the unit circle. The negative derivative of the kernel is denoted by g(z
. Following the notations in [2] , for a single tracker without interference, the model of target i is described by an M -bin histogram q i = {q im } m=1,··· ,M , and the target hypothesis by
is the Kronecker delta function and the function b(·) maps the pixel location x n to a bin index m. The Bhattacharyya coefficient ρ(y i ) is employed to measure the similarity between a target hypothesis and the model
Since the distance from the hypothesis histogram p i (y i ) to the model histogram q i can be defined as d(y i ) = 1 − ρ(y i ), the likelihood model for tracker i (in Eq. 2) without considering interference can be formulated as:
Kernel-based interference model
Due to partial occlusion, we need to consider the interference among the N targets, i.e.
The observation model for tracker i is no longer solely determined by y i but the joint motion configuration of all trackers (which is denoted by {y i , y −i } = {y i , · · · , y N } to highlight other trackers' interference to tracker i). In view of this, we generalize the kernel-based histogram model by,
where C i ≤ 1 is a normalization term. The probability that the pixel x n is within Ω i is approximated by
where
] is the histogram bin value for pixel x n in the target model q i . Please note when using Epanechnikov kernel with a finite support, if one tracker has no overlap with others, Eq. 9 degenerates to Eq. 6. To avoid numerical problems, we set q im = > 0, ∀m < M, where is a very small value, to guarantee non-zero bins q im (x n ) and q jm (x n ).
The generalized Bhattacharyya coefficient is defined aŝ
Then, the likelihood model for target i with interference is formulated as:
This interference model takes both the appearance similarity and spatial relations into account. This interference model down-weights those pixels that are in the overlapped regions of different trackers and have ambiguous identities.
Game-theoretic multiple target tracking
Based on the interference model, we can formulate the joint motion estimation (Sec. 4.1) and construct a game (Sec. 4.2) whose N.E. corresponds to a local optimum of the joint motion estimation and can be efficiently solved (Sec. 4.3). The algorithm is summarized in Sec. 4.4.
Joint motion estimation
Assuming that the scales remain constant when multiple targets approach to each other, based on the interference likelihood model (Eq. 11), the minimization of the joint energy (in Eq. 4) is equivalent to:
Maximizing the joint likelihood is equivalent to optimizing the joint kernel locations of all targets that maximize the sum of the generalized Bhattacharyya coefficients.
Denote the initial locations of the trackers by {y
where ω i (x n ) is determined by the initial status of tracker î p im (y 
Since only the second term in Eq. 13 is related to the variable {y i , y −i } given the initial locations, we can ignore the terms in J 1 that are not affected by {y 1 , · · · , y N }. Then we redefine the objective function and have:
where r i (y i , y −i ) corresponds to the individual matching of tracker i (as the second term in Eq. 13):
.
Since ∇J 2 w.r.t. to {y 1 , · · · , y N } is intractable, we further approximate it with a lower bound J 3 ≤ J 2 :
This proximation means that the pixels in the occlusion regions are further down-weighted as
This is reasonable, since we don't explicitly recover the occlusion relations among the targets and a natural choice is to reduce their contributions to the weighted histograms.
Game construction and formulation
Although it is natural to design a game to model the competition among multiple trackers, the construction of the game cannot be arbitrary, e.g. based on intuitions or heuristics, because the equilibrium of the game may not necessarily be a solution to MTT. For example, if we formulate a naive non-cooperative game N, {R 2 }, {ρ i (y i , y −i )} , where the players correspond to the individual trackers, the strategy for each player is the motion y i ∈ R 2 , and its utilityρ i (y i , y −i ) is the generalized Bhattacharyya coefficient. This naive game is unable to assure a social optimal behavior ( that corresponds to a good joint solution to MTT), because each tracker will try to solely increase its own utility. Special care has to be taken in the game construction.
A local optimum {y * = 0, ∀i, is held at N.E.. Consequently, the N.E. also satisfies the KKT conditions of J 3 . Therefore, this construction of the game is plausible, and maximizing J 3 is equivalent to finding the N.E.. Fortunately, this can be solved efficiently by a decentralized best response updating, as described below.
Finding a Nash Equilibrium
To find a N.E., we design a decentralized synchronous scheme to update the best response for each tracker. Namely, ∀i, assuming all the other trackers' locations y −i are given, we find the bestŷ i that maximizes the utility r tot (y i , y −i ), i.e. to solve ∇ yi r tot (y i , y −i ) = 0. The justification of this iterative process can be found in Sec. 5. We have, ∀i,
(21) Eq. 21 can be solved in a closed-form. To make the derivation clear, we denote
Then, we have
and for i = j, we have,
Please note y i merely influencesr j (y j , y −j ) through the overlapped region {x n ∈ Ω j ∩ Ω i } and g(|| xn−yi hi || 2 ) is uniform for Epanechnikov kernel. ∇ yirj (y j , y −j ) acts as a force of the jth tracker that pushes away the ith tracker.
Plugging Eq. 24 and Eq. 25 to Eq. 21, we can solve the bestŷ i given y −i in a closed form. To make things clear, we define two more coefficients w ii (x n ) and w ji (x n ) for pixel x n ∈ Ω i ,
(27) We have,
Therefore, considering the interference of the target i to all the others targets and given the locations of other targets, the bestŷ i that maximizes the utility iŝ
For each frame I (t) , when N trackers approach to each other, we can iteratively update y i , i = 1, · · · , N by Eq. 29. This iterative process reaches an equilibrium that achieves a local optimum of the joint motion estimation.
A geometrical explanation is the following. We can vieŵ y i as a combination of forcesŷ i←j which is the solution to ∇ yirj (y j , y −j ) = 0 aŝ
y i←j acts as tracker j's counter force to tracker i when considering y i 's interference inr j (y j , y −j ). This can be visualized in Fig. 1 . 
Algorithm summary
We summarize our game-theoretic MTT algorithm. If a subset of targets approach to each other, and their hypotheses are overlapped (the distances less than a threshold), we generate a game and use the algorithm in Fig. 3 to search for the N.E. If one target is isolated from others we use Meanshift tracker. The procedure is summarized in Fig. 2 .
Input : Frame I
(t) , target models {q i }, and initial states of the set of individual trackers θ (t−1) = {y
1. Divide trackers into different groups if they are in close vicinity.
2. For each group of trackers, if it has more than one tracker in the group, generate a game and call the algorithm in Fig. 3 , otherwise call Mean-shift tracker [2] .
For each individual tracker, search h (t)
i with discrete scale factors {0.95, 1, 1.05} to maximize its generalized Bhattacharyya coefficientρ(ŷ i ,ŷ −i ). 2. In order to calculate ∇ yiri (y i , y −i ) in Eq. 24, for each pixel x n ∈ Ω i , calculate
3. In order to calculate ∇ yjri (y i , y −i ) in Eq. 25 (note switch subscript i and j), for tracker
• η ij (x n ) according to Eq. 23, • w ij (x n ) according to Eq. 27. 
Game theoretic analysis
In the game G we have constructed, the utility function of each player is the joint matching r tot (y i , y −i ) = N ir (y i , y −i ), which forces an individual tracker to take other trackers' influences into consideration rather than only focusing on its own interest. ∇ yirj (y j , y −j ), i.e. the sensitivity of tracker j's matching w.r.t tracker i's motion y i , can be regarded as a price tracker j charges tracker i and counter reacts to y i throughŷ i←j .
To analyze whether the Nash Equilibrium can be achieved by the best response updating for game G = N, {R 2 }, {r tot (y 1 , · · · , y N )} , we resort to the following definition and theorem in the supermodular game theory [15, 16] . 
Theorem 1 In a supermodular (submodular) game G = {N, S, {f i }}, (a) there exists at least one Nash Equilibrium; (b) if each player starts from any feasible strategy and uses best response updating, then the joint strategies will eventually converge to a Nash Equilibrium.
For details about supermodular games, we refer the readers to Chapter 4 in [15] and Chapter 7 in [16] .
Based on the supermodular game theory, to show the best response updating can reach a N.E., a sufficient condition includes 1) the solution of Eq. 21 is a best response ofŷ i given fixed y −i , and 2) the game G is a supermodular/submodular game. Condition 1 is satisfied since r tot (y i , y −i ) is concave on y i in that the Epanechnikov kernel function k is non-negative and strictly concave. The details are given in Appendix A. The condition 2 can be satisfied in certain Ω i , i = 1, · · · , N where each utility function is submodular function, which is given in Appendix B.
Experiments
We demonstrate the proposed game-theoretic MTT by using both synthesized and real video (downloaded from Google Video). The basic individual tracker is a Mean-shift trackers with 32 × 32 2D histogram in the Hue-Saturation space. To purely evaluate the performance of the proposed method, we do not incorporate motion dynamic prior, object detectors, and background subtraction, although it is easy to incorporate them. The method is implemented in C++ and tested on Pentium IV 3Ghz PC. Empirically, the best response updating converges very quickly within 3-10 iterations, so the computations are almost the same as that in multiple independent Mean-shift trackers.
Example of best response updating
First, we show an example of the best response updating for tracking the hands and the face in a sign language video. The first 4 images in Fig. 4 show the positions of the hands and the face at the first 3 iterations and at the last iteration during the best response updating. We observe that the sum of generalized Bhattacharyya coefficients 3 i=1ρ (y i , y −i ) monotonically increases as shown in the last graph. But the individualρ(y i , y −i ) may be up and down. This is a rather difficult case because the hands and the face share the same skin tones. In our method, the competition ends up at an equilibrium that gives a good estimation of them.
Synthesized video
We synthesize two videos in which there are 3 different targets and 5 identical targets, respectively. The backgrounds include random noise and 10-20 small targets that are wandering randomly. Frame samples are shown in Fig. 5 . The trackers are drawn in different colors and a red dash ellipse indicates the group of trackers that are engaged in the game. The final motionŷ i are drawn at the centers of the targets. From the test results, the competition among the targets leads to an equilibrium and largely avoids the coalescence problem.
Real video
We further test the proposed approach in real sign language and sports videos. These are very challenging tests for MTT. The hand gesturing in sign language video (Fig. 6 ) is fast and the hand shape is deformable. Since the color of the hands and the face are quite similar, when the hands moving in front of the head, it is very likely that independent trackers will fail as shown in the 2nd row of Fig. 6 . On the contrary, in our method, the interference from the face tracker to the hands tends to push the hands away from the face, which greatly alleviates coalescence phenomenons.
Sports video is another large category where the athletes generally wear similar sports suits and may have very complicated interactions. Therefore tracking the people in sports video is a very difficult task. We show the tracking results for kid soccer, free style soccer and volleyball. The proposed method can follow the people with complicated occlusions. The comparison to the results of independent trackers are in the supplemental materials.
Conclusion
In this paper we introduce a new view of game theory to the study of multiple target tracking. The competition of individual trackers is formulated as a game and we bridge the solution to the joint motion estimation and the Nash Equilibrium of the game. Consequently, the maximization of the joint likelihood can be decentralized. The N.E. of this game can be solved by an efficient iterative procedure in a closed form. The proposed method achieves promising results in tracking quasi-identical targets in both synthesized and real video sequences. The future work includes the incorporation of motion dynamic models in the trackers' utilities and faster algorithms for computing approximate N.E. 
